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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
flict separate injuries; and the application of this test, in People v. Warren,
1 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 338 (1852), leads to the result that where two persons
are killed by the same act of poisoning an acquittal of the poisoning of one
is no bar to prosecution for the poisoning of the other, because there was a
separate intent to poison each victim.
As to whether there may be more than one prosecution, as for separate as-
saults, where the defendant shoots at one person and hits another instead,
there is another conflict of authority. For the view that such prosecutions
would constitute double jeopardy, see Spanell v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 418, 203
S. W. 357 (1918) ; for the contrary view, see People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App.
225, 233 P. 88 (1925). The preponderance of authority seems to favor the
former holding. (See also note, 2 A. L. R. 606, and cases cited.)
F. W. F. '27.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INTOXICATING LiQuos.-Plaintiff
arrested and part of his stock seized under warrant issued six days previously,
with no evidence of any unavoidable delay in the service thereof. Held, that
process must be executed in reasonable time where no time is named in pro-
cess or law authorizing it, and intoxicating liquors seized under a search war-
rant so delayed in service is inadmissible as evidence. State v. Wiedeman,
(Ill. 1926) 154 N. E. 432.
The matter of what constitutes a reasonable time is regulated in many states
by statute, and penalties are imposed on officers who fail to comply with the
requirement. In states where the period of reasonableness is not regulated by
statute, it is determined according to the circumstances of the case, such as
the distance to the place to be searched, the condition of the roads, the facil-
ities for travel, and the demands made upon the time of the officer. If there
is any delay, it must be entirely unavoidable. In State v. Guthrie, 38 Atl. 368,
where the delay was three days, and could not be explained, the warrant was
held void. In Weston v. Carr. 71 Me. 356 a delay of more than 24 hours was held
unreasonable.
All searches and seizures must be reasonable (Const. Art. 2, Sect. 6), and
a search made under a warrant which has become functus officio, by reason
of its not having been served until six days after it was issued, is not rea-
sonable. Link v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 778; CORNELIUS ON SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURES, sect. 141. Where intoxicating liquors have been obtained under a search
%arrant not meeting the requirements of the Constitution, they will not be
admissible in evidence. All the authorities seem to be agreed on these points,
and the Supreme Court of Missouri unhesitatingly confirms them in State v.
Hude, 297 Mo. 213. D. C. J., '28.
EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMoNY-ADMISSIBILITY OF DECEPTION TESTS.-In a
prosecution for rape the deposition of a doctor that he administered a "truth-
telling serum" to the defendant and while under its influence the defendant
denied guilt was offered in evidence on behalf of the defendant. The testimony
was excluded. Held, the evidence was properly excluded as unworthy of con-
sideration. State v. Hudson, (Mo. 1926), 289 S. W. 920.
The past two decades have witnessed increasing interest in the results of
scientific study of human behavior. In the field of criminology only tentative
deductions have been made and none of the deception tests yet devised support
a claim of infallibility. Suggested tests are the "association word and time
reaction"; the "respiration" or "internal excitement"; the "galvanometric"; and
the "systolic and diastolic blood-pressures." For a discussion of these see,
William M. Marston, "Psychological Possibilities in the Deception Tests," 11
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JoUR. CRIm. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 551; John A Larson, "Modification of the
Marston Deception Tests" 12 ibid 390; 13 ibid 121; John A. Larson, "The Berke-
ley Lie Detector and other Deception Tests," 47 Amf. BAR Assoc. REPTs. 619; and
Herman M. Adler, "The Interests of Psychiatry in Criminal Procedure," 47
ibid 629. The "systolic blood-pressure" test, the theory of which is that truth
is spontaneous and comes without conscious effort while the utterance of a
falsehood requires a conscious effort was rejected in the case of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013. So long as experimenting psychologists admit the im-
perfection of their deception tests it seems proper to exclude such tests from evi-
dence in criminal prosecutions. In view of the fact that in the instant case the
test was not conducted by the prosecution the decision may be supported on the
further ground of its operation as a self-serving declaration. T. S. '27.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-TRANSPORTATION-SuFFIcIENCY OF EvIDENcE-This
was a prosecution for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. The de-
fendant was riding as a guest in the automobile of a third person. When ap-
proached by the sheriff the defendant threw a one gallon jug of intoxicating
liquor from the car. Held, that this fact was insufficient to support a convic-
tion. State v. Duskin, (Iowa 1926) 210 N. W. 421.
Statutes enacted by a number of states in the past few years have given rise
to a great mass of litigation on the subject of transportation of intoxicating
liquor. Many of these statutes are similar to the one in Missouri which pro-
vides: "The words 'transport" and 'transportation' . . . shall be held to
mean and include every mode, method, or means of carrying or conveying, in-
toxicating liquor from place to place in any container or receptacle, of whatso-
ever kind or character, and by whatsoever means used, except carrying intoxi-
cating liquor on person." Laws of Missouri, 1923, p. 242, Sec. 19. A question
almost constantly arising under these statutes has been whether or not the evi-
dence was sufficient to support a conviction. Upon none of the phases of the
question is there unanimity of opinion. It has been held that to sustain a con-
viction it is not necessary that the defendant be owner of the liquor, Green v.
Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 698, 243 S. W. 917; Maynard v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 580,
249 S. W. 473; that he have any pecuniary interest in it or custody thereof,
Szymanski v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 631, 249 S. W. 380; or have the lawful posses-
sion of the vehicle used in the transportation, Melcher v. State, 109 Neb. 865,
192 N. W. 502. Convictions have also been sustained where the evidence
showed that the defendant, while driving away from officers threw a jug of
liquor from the car, State v. Roten, (Mo.), 266 S. W. 994; that two defendants
when approached by officers got out of the car and ran and as they did so one
of the defendants removed a gallon jug of whisky from under his clothing
and broke it on a large stone, Simpson et al v. State, 195 Ind. 633, 149 N. E.
50; that defendants while fleeing from officers poured liquor from vessels con-
taining it and threw a demijohn from the car, State v. Habel, et at, 134 S. C. 386,
132 S. E. 838; that defendant destroyed two jars, one containing water and the
other whisky which belonged to the driver of the automobile, Brooks v. State,
93 Tex. Cr. 206, 247 S. W. 517; and that officers met a car on the highway and
a few hours later found liquor in the same car which had parked in front of
a house, State v. Bennett et al, (Mo.) 270 S. W. 295. The evidence has been
held insufficient to sustain a conviction where it appeared that the defendant
claimed no interest in whisky found in his son's car in which he was riding, or
knew it was in the car or that he was driving the car at the time, Panton v'.
State, 99 Tex. Cr. 93, 268 S. W. 155; that defendant was seen with a suitcase
to leave an automobile and a short time afterwards the suitcase containing
whisky was found in an old house, State v. Ridge, (Mo.), 275 S. W. 59; that
the occupant of an automobile took a drink from a bottle of whisky handed
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